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GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: HOW 
THE COURTS DISMANTLED THE DOCTRINE 
OF SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE 
TREVOR FINDLEY† 
INTRODUCTION 
Most Americans with a basic understanding of civics can tell you 
that the legislative branch creates the law, the executive branch 
implements the law, and the judicial branch interprets the law.  Any 
lawyer can tell you that the lines between creating, implementing, and 
interpreting the law are not clear cut.  Absent meaningful guidance 
from Congress, blurred lines and inconsistent interpretations are 
particularly apparent in the regulation of biotechnology in the United 
States.  Because the laws governing biotechnology are based on laws 
that  predate the advent of genetically engineered (“GE”) crops,1 they 
are often inadequate to address the unique concerns presented by 
genetic engineering, such as compositional differences in food 
products, cross-pollination with non-genetically engineered crops, and 
what authority agencies have to regulate and monitor the use of GE 
products.  As a result, Congress needs to provide meaningful authority 
for the regulation of biotechnology. 
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1. Throughout this article, “genetically engineered,” “genetic engineering” and
“biotechnology” refer to modern biotechnology, which are “new and controversial techniques 
which involve the transfer of genes between species in a manner and at a speed not previously 
possible.”  Rebecca Bratspies, Some Thoughts on the American Approach to Regulating 
Genetically Modified Organisms, 16 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 393, 398 n.21 (2007).  More 
specifically, Article 3 of the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Biodiversity defines 
modern biotechnology as: “[T]he application of: (a) [i]n vitro nucleic acid techniques, including 
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or 
organelles, or (b) fusion of cells beyond taxonomic family, that overcome natural physiological 
reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding 
and selection.” Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity art. 3 
Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027.  The author recognizes that others may define biotechnology in 
much broader terms that include traditional plant breeding techniques, such as hybridization and 
cross-pollination, which have taken place for centuries. 
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From the outset, the regulation of biotechnology has largely 
occurred outside the halls of Congress.  Currently, the executive 
branch of the United States relies on the Coordinated Framework for 
the Regulation of Biotechnology (“Coordinated Framework”), which 
is a legacy of the Reagan Administration.  In drafting the Coordinated 
Framework, the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the 
Executive Office of the President interpreted existing laws to 
determine what authority government agencies had to regulate 
biotechnology.  Lacking meaningful guidance from Congress, the 
executive and judicial branches have been at the front of setting 
governmental policy for regulating biotechnology today. 
If the U.S. laws applicable to GE crops actually fit into the existing 
framework, as the drafters of the Coordinated Framework suggested, 
regulation outside the halls of Congress would not necessarily be a 
problem.  But, as this article demonstrates, the use of GE technology 
in the United States has not fallen squarely within existing legal 
authority, courts have struggled to interpret Coordinated Framework 
principles, and gaps have emerged which do not adequately protect the 
interests of all Americans. 
One example illustrates the Coordinated Framework’s 
inadequacy.  After ten years of research, scientists in Australia’s 
national research organization, the Commonwealth Science and 
Industrial Research Organization, ended a project to bring GE peas to 
market.2  The peas contained a natural protein gene from green beans 
that prevents weevils from digesting starch, thereby causing them to 
starve to death.3  The protein from the donor plant, the green bean, 
had no history of allergenicity.4  Just before the scientists were ready 
to release the GE pea onto the market, they completed an additional 
study that revealed the protein from the green bean plant, when 
expressed in the pea plant, demonstrated allergenic properties in mice.5  
Not only was the GE pea allergenic, it caused the mice to react to other 
allergens.6  A heretofore non-allergenic protein became allergenic 
when transferred to a new plant.  Had researchers not completed the 
additional study, which they were under no regulatory obligation to 
 
 2. Katharine A. Van Tassel, Genetically Modified Plants Used for Food, Risk Assessment 
and Uncertainty Principles: Does the Transition from Ignorance to Indeterminacy Trigger the Need 
for Post-Market Surveillance?, 15 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 220, 232 (2009). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. at 233. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
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complete, the potentially allergenic pea plant would have been 
commercially available on the market. 
Although this specific example originates in Australia, a U.S. 
manufacturer of a similar GE pea plant would have been under no 
obligation to complete allergenic testing and could have released the 
product to the market.7  Alternatively, if Australia had not completed 
the additional study and instead commercialized the crop, growers and 
retailers in the United States could have easily imported the product 
and sold it to American consumers without them knowing of its 
allergenic properties.8  As this example makes clear, the Coordinated 
Framework fails to mandate safety testing accounting for potential 
allergenicity, among other things, in GE products. 
This article first analyzes the Coordinated Framework and its 
origins.  After examining the current regulatory structure, the article 
examines two different cases in each of three different areas impacted 
by GE products: food safety and composition, the environment, and 
intellectual property.  A look at each of these cases highlights the 
judiciary’s approach to the Coordinated Framework and the 
framework’s underlying principle of substantial equivalence, and 
illuminates some of the challenges in applying existing law to new 
technology.  Finally, the article analyzes the ways in which courts 
appear reluctant to perpetuate the doctrine of substantial equivalence 
but lack the authority necessary to provide meaningful results.  
Consequently, the article concludes that Congress should abandon the 
untenable Coordinated Framework and provide meaningful authority 
for the regulation of biotechnology. 
I. THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK 
In 1986, the United States government determined that the 
existing regulatory framework was sufficient to regulate 
biotechnology, premising this idea on the notion that products of 
 
 7. See Thomas O. McGarity, Seeds of Distrust: Federal Regulation of Genetically Modified 
Foods, 35 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 403, 446–47 (2002) (discussing the regulatory process in the 
United States under an identical scenario and concluding that a manufacturer could determine 
that, “a plant with a previous history of safe use containing increased levels of a previously 
produced protein not ‘known’ to be toxic is substantially equivalent to the unmodified plant and 
is therefore [generally recognized as safe]”). Id. at 446. 
 8. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 413 (citing USDA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON 
BIOTECHNOLOGY and 21ST CENTURY AGRICULTURE, OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES IN 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE DECADE AHEAD (2006), http://www.usda.gov/docume 
nts/final_main_report-v6.pdf (acknowledging regulatory gaps, including the import of GE 
products from other countries). 
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biotechnology are substantially equivalent to their natural 
counterparts.  As a result, the government determined it did not need 
new laws or regulations to regulate biotechnology or to determine the 
safety of products derived from biotechnology.  The United States 
presented this idea in the 1986 Coordinated Framework for Regulation 
of Biotechnology.9  The Coordinated Framework recognized the use of 
genetic engineering as an extension of traditional plant breeding 
techniques such as hybridization and selective breeding.10  The working 
group responsible for its drafting “sought to achieve a balance between 
regulation adequate to ensure health and environmental safety while 
maintaining sufficient regulatory flexibility to avoid impeding the 
growth of an infant industry.”11 With the backdrop of increased 
technological innovation in Asia and under the leadership of a 
president known for deregulation, the government recognized that the 
biotechnology industry needed flexibility in order to remain 
competitive and that science could likely advance faster than the 
government could regulate.12 As a result, U.S. policy toward 
biotechnology has been favorable to industry from the outset.13 
Central to the Coordinated Framework is the notion that the final 
product, and not the process by which it was created, should be the 
focus of regulation.14  According to the drafters, existing laws regulated 
the safety of food and pesticide products created using traditional plant 
breeding techniques; because genetic engineering is an extension of 
traditional techniques, “[t]his approach provides the opportunity for 
similar products to be treated similarly by regulatory agencies.”15  By 
focusing on the product, regardless of the process by which it is created, 
regulatory authority covers genetically engineered products just as 
they would conventionally grown products.16  This authority includes 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), and the Plant 
 
 9. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302, 
23,303 (June 26, 1986). 
 10. Id. at 23,302. 
 11. Id. at 23,302–03. 
 12. Id. at 23,303. 
 13. Luis Acosta, Restrictions on Genetically Modified Organisms: United States, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS (July 9, 2015), http://www.loc.gov/law/help/restrictions-on-gmos/usa.php (“Compared 
to other countries, regulation of GMOs in the US is relatively favorable to their development.”). 
 14. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 406. 
 15. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 
23,302. 
 16. McGarity, supra note 7, at 427. 
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Protection Act (PPA). The following briefly highlights the 
responsibilities of the three main agencies involved in the regulation of 
agricultural biotechnology. 
A. The Food and Drug Administration 
Consistent with the Coordinated Framework, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) did not implement any regulations to govern 
biotechnology, but instead relied on existing laws and a non-binding 
policy statement.  Under the FDCA, the FDA has the authority to 
regulate adulterated food, food labeling, and food additives, among 
other things.17  Adulterated food is food that “bears or contains any 
poisonous or deleterious substance which may render it injurious to 
health.”18  If the FDA ever determined that a GE food may be injurious 
to health, it would have the authority to regulate that food. 
A food additive is “any substance the intended use of which results 
or may reasonably be expected to result, directly or indirectly, in its 
becoming a component or otherwise affecting the characteristics of any 
food.”19  If a substance is “generally recognized as safe” (“GRAS”) by 
experts in the field, it is not a food additive and may be added to food 
without approval by the FDA.20  Based on the doctrine of substantial 
equivalence, the FDA concluded in its 1992 Statement of Policy: Foods 
Derived from New Plant Varieties (“Statement of Policy”), that in 
“most cases, the substances expected to become components of food 
as a result of genetic modification of a plant will be the same as or 
substantially similar to substances commonly found in food.”21  As a 
result, the FDA presumes that most GE foods are GRAS.22  The FDA 
also enforces EPA tolerance levels for pesticide residue on foods, but 
does not engage in any form of ongoing monitoring of GE foods.23 
B. Environmental Protection Agency 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has authority 
under FIFRA to regulate a substance that prevents, destroys, repels, 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. 21 U.S.C. § 342(a)(1) (2012). 
 19. 21 U.S.C. § 321(s) (2012). 
 20. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 408. 
 21. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, 57 Fed. Reg. 22,984, 
22,985 (May 29, 1992). 
 22. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 408. 
 23. Id. at 410. 
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or mitigates a pest.24  This includes the authority to regulate transgenic 
mutations such as bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), a bacteria endogenously 
produced in some GE crops to prevent pests.25  The EPA also has 
authority under FDCA to set tolerance levels for pesticide residue on 
foods and can exempt entire classes of pesticides from having a 
tolerance level.26  The EPA does not have authority to regulate GE 
plants that do not produce pesticides.27 Although the EPA can regulate 
the amount of pesticide use on herbicide resistant GE crops, such as 
glyphosate resistant corn and soybeans, it does not have regulatory 
authority over the crops themselves.28 
C. United States Department of Agriculture 
Under the Federal Plant Pest Act of 1957 later combined with 
other authority to create the Plant Pest Act of 2000 (PPA), the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) through the Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) has authority to regulate 
products of biotechnology that rely on bacteria or viral vectors.29  This 
authority extends only to GE crops that use known plant pests and 
does not require the USDA to examine GE crops that do not use 
known plant pests.30 
Like other government agencies, APHIS begins its analysis of GE 
crops under the assumption that GE crops are substantially equivalent 
to their natural counterparts.31  In general, APHIS does not require a 
permit before a biotech company begins field trials of a GE crop.32  
Rather, APHIS utilizes a less stringent notification procedure.33  After 




 24. 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (2012). 
 25. EPA’s Regulation of Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) Crops, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/biopesticides/pips/regofbtcrops.htm (last updated May 
2015). 
 26. Linda Beebe, In re Starlink Corn: The Link Between Genetically Damaged Crops and an 
Inadequate Regulatory Framework for Biotechnology, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
511, 519 (2004). 
 27. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 411. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Alison Peck, The Case of GMOs, 46 CREIGHTON L. REV. 653, 660 (2013). 
 30. Beebe, supra note 26, at 518. 
 31. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 412. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 7 C.F.R. § 340.3 (2016). 
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subsequently, commercial sale of the product.34  Once deregulated, 
APHIS no longer has authority over a GE crop.35 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL EQUIVALENCE 
The underlying assumption of the Coordinated Framework, made 
with little explanation, is that GE seeds create a product substantially 
equivalent to seeds created by traditional breeding techniques.36  To 
the extent the Coordinated Framework substantiates this underlying 
assumption of substantial equivalence, it highlights that genetic 
engineering “enable[s] more precise genetic modifications, and 
therefore hold[s] the promise for exciting innovation and new areas of 
commercial opportunity.”37  Because it is more precise, it seems, there 
should be little concern about anything other than its ability to drive 
new markets. 
While the Coordinated Framework demonstrates the 
government’s reliance on the doctrine of substantial equivalence, the 
100+ page document only uses the phrase “substantially equivalent” 
three times, all in reference to medical devices.38  The phrase 
“substantial equivalence” first came into popular parlance in a 
document published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development—the Safety Evaluation of Foods Derived by 
Modern Biotechnology, Concepts and Principles (“OECD Safety 
Evaluation”)—in 1992.39  The report focuses exclusively on the safety 
of food for human health, and does not consider the safety of 
genetically engineered crops on animals or the environment.40 
When the OECD used substantial equivalence, it examined the 
process for evaluating the safety of new foods, and not the presumption 
that foods created by biotechnology are substantially equivalent to 
their natural counterparts.41  The safety evaluation, however, largely 
appears as an attempt to demonstrate that biotech products are  
 
 
 34. Bratspies, supra note 1, at 412. 
 35. Id. 
 36. McGarity, supra note 7, at 431. 
 37. The Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. at 
23,302. 
 38. See generally id. 
 39. McGarity, supra note 7, at 428. 
 40. See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
SAFETY EVALUATION OF FOODS DERIVED BY MODERN BIOTECHNOLOGY: CONCEPTS AND 
PRINCIPLES (1993) [hereinafter “OECD Safety Evaluation”]. 
 41. See generally id. 
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substantially equivalent to their natural counterparts, thereby 
obviating the need for further analysis.42 
In order to show substantial equivalence, a regulator should look 
at any processing the food may undergo, the use of the food in the 
human diet, the exposure of the food to humans, the pattern of 
consumption, and the attributes of consumers.43  The OECD also 
recommends looking at the traits, composition, and characteristics of 
the traditional or parental organism; potential secondary effects of the 
modification; and any knowledge of the new product and its new 
traits.44  When a regulator determines a product is not substantially 
equivalent to its natural counterpart or it has no natural counterpart, 
additional testing is necessary.45 
Although the OECD report appears to suggest regulators have to 
prove substantial equivalence by examining the genetically engineered 
product and considering a number of factors, the process it outlines 
seems woefully inadequate given that scientists are creating new food 
through processes not exhibited in nature.46  Instead, according to the 
OECD, “the most practical approach to the determination of [the] 
safety [of GE foods] is to consider whether they are substantially 
equivalent to analogous conventional products.”47  Thus, the first step 
in determining safety is to determine whether the GE product is 
substantially equivalent to its natural counterpart.  Once completed, 
safety appears to be a foregone conclusion.48 
The case studies included in the OECD Safety Evaluation provide 
more guidance than the main text of the document.49  Case study one, 
completed by the FDA, explains the process for determining the safety 
of genetically engineered microbial chymosin, as compared to that of 
its natural counterpart, animal rennet.50  In the case study, the FDA 
determined that, although functionally identical, the processes used by 
 
 42. Id. at 16. 
 43. Id. at 15. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 14–15. 
 46. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 430 (“Employing the substantial equivalence doctrine [will 
not] take into account all of the subtle changes in delicately balanced biochemical pathways within 
genetically engineered plants.”). 
 47. OECD Safety Evaluation, supra note 40, at 14 (emphasis omitted). 
 48. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 430–31 (“[T]he substantial equivalence doctrine is not so 
much a ‘scientific’ risk assessment tool as it is an excuse for regulatory agencies to avoid their 
responsibilities.”). 
 49. See id. at 430–31 (noting the great amount of discretion and flexibility in determining 
substantial equivalence). 
 50. OECD Safety Evaluation, supra note 40, at 21–22. 
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manufacturers to create chymosin and rennet are different enough to 
warrant a formal review “in order to determine whether the new 
preparation was substantially equivalent to the traditional one.”51 
Thus, the FDA did not start from the position of substantial 
equivalence even though the two enzymes are functionally identical. 
Instead, it examined the production process, which used procedures 
substantially equivalent to those it would use for other, non-genetically 
engineered enzymes, to determine that chymosin’s use as an enzyme in 
food is safe.52  Thus, unlike the Coordinated Framework, the FDA 
appears to have examined the process to determine safety for purposes 
of the OECD Safety Evaluation. 
Therefore, the doctrine of substantial equivalence in the United 
States appears to be of mixed origin.  The underlying principles are 
rooted in the Coordinated Framework, which acknowledged that the 
laws governing naturally occurring counterparts were sufficient to 
regulate products of biotechnology.  The actual phrase “substantial 
equivalence” as it relates to food originates in the OECD Safety 
Evaluation, although apparently in a slightly different context than the 
proposition for which it stands today in the United States.  For 
purposes of this article, the relevant point is that the approach of the 
executive and legislative branches of government remains relatively 
unchanged since the 1986 Coordinated Framework.53  For producers of 
agricultural biotech products in the United States, this means they 
continue to operate in a framework where the underlying 
presumption—one which they need not independently prove in the 
 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53.  Just prior to publication, the Obama Administration released its proposed updates to 
the Coordinated Framework.  On January 4, 2017, days before the end of President Obama’s 
Administration, the White House released the “2017 Update to the Coordinated Framework for 
the Regulation of Biotechnology” and the “National Strategy for Modernizing the Regulatory 
System for Biotechnology Products.”  Along with the announcement, the FDA and the USDA 
released proposed rules to update how they regulate biotechnology.  Because of uncertainty 
surrounding the Trump Administration’s approach to new regulations-and the likelihood such 
proposed regulations will be implemented in their current form-it would be premature to include 
an analysis of the proposed regulations in this article.  See Robbie Barbero, James Kim, Ted 
Boling, & Julia Doherty, Increasing the Transparency, Coordination, and Predictability of the 
Biotechnology Regulatory System, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 4, 2017),  https://obamawhitehouse.archiv 
es.gov/blog/2017/01/04/increasing-transparency-coordination-and-predictability-biotechnology-r 
egulatory; Regulation of Intentionally Altered Genomic DNA in Animals; Draft Guidance for 
Industry; Availability, 82 Fed. Reg. 6,561 (Jan. 19, 2017),  https://www.federalregister.gov/docume 
nts/2017/01/19/2017-00839/regulation-of-intentionally-altered-genomic-dna-in-animals-draft-gui 
dance-for-industry-availability;  U.S. Dept. of Agric, 2017 Proposed Biotechnology Regulations 
(Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/biotechnology/biotech-rule-revision/ 
2016-340-rule/2016-340-home. 
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regulatory process—is that products of biotechnology are substantially 
equivalent to their natural counterparts.54 
III. BIOTECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTS 
This section examines the judicial branch’s approach to 
biotechnology by examining two cases in three different areas 
impacted by biotechnology: food safety and composition, the 
environment, and intellectual property. 
A. Food Safety and Composition 
One of the first challenges to the Coordinated Framework took 
place in Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala.55  The plaintiffs included 
scientists, religious leaders, and other individuals concerned about GE 
foods.56  They challenged the FDA’s Statement of Policy in which it 
announced that foods created through biotechnology were generally 
recognized as safe under the FDCA, and therefore not subject to 
regulation as food additives.57  The FDA made the Statement of Policy 
without notice and comment, and did not provide an environmental 
assessment or an environmental impact statement.58 
The Statement of Policy reaffirmed the FDA’s commitments 
made under the Coordinated Framework that the product, and not the 
process, should be the focal point for determining safety.59 The FDA 
also acknowledged that its position was consistent with the “concepts 
of substantial equivalence of new foods discussed in a document under 
development” by the OECD,60 confirmed that products made with GE 
foods need not be labeled,61 and stated that “substances expected to 
become components of food as a result of genetic modification of a 
plant will be the same as or substantially similar to substances 




 54. McGarity, supra note 7, at 431. 
 55. 116 F. Supp. 2d 166 (2000). 
 56. Id. at 170. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Statement of Policy: Foods Derived From New Plant Materials, 57 Fed. Reg. at 22,9484–
85. 
 60. Id. at 22,992. 
 61. Id. at 22,991. 
 62. Id. at 22,985. 
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Plaintiffs challenged a variety of aspects of the Statement of 
Policy, alleging that the FDA failed to comply with applicable notice 
and comment procedures, failed to comply with the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) when it did not complete an 
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement, acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when it presumed GRAS status for GE 
foods, and violated the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) when it decided to not require 
labeling.63 
On the claim that FDA violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act’s rulemaking requirements, the court held that the Policy 
Statement was in fact a policy statement, not a rule, because it did not 
bind the agency and only created a presumption of GRAS.64  Because 
it is a policy statement and not a binding rule, notice and comment 
rulemaking was not required.65  The Court also found that the FDA did 
not violate NEPA when it failed to complete an environmental 
assessment or environmental impact statement because the agency did 
not take an agency action, but merely preserved the status quo.66 
Moreover, the agency’s GRAS presumption was subject to 
Chevron deference and therefore not arbitrary and capricious.67 The 
court based its decision about arbitrary and capricious action on the 
record at the time the agency created the Policy Statement in 1992, so 
information about the safety of GE technology provided by Plaintiffs 
after that point could not be used to demonstrate that the FDA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously.68 
The Plaintiffs also failed on their labeling claim.  The court viewed 
the FDA’s conclusion—that the use of GE technology in foods is not a 
“material difference” from the use of their naturally occurring 
counterparts—as a finding entitled to deference.69  Therefore, the FDA 
did not have to label GE foods, and in fact could not, as the FDA does 
not have authority to mandate labeling based solely on consumer 
opinion.70 
 
 63. All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 170. 
 64. Id. at 173. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 174–75. 
 67. Id. at 176–77. 
 68. Id. at 177. 
 69. Id. at 179. 
 70. Id. Also on the labeling claims, the court denied the First Amendment free exercise claim 
because the policy statement is neutral and generally applicable. Id. at 179–80. The court denied 
the RFRA claim because labeling food for purposes of religion would come “precariously close 
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Although plaintiffs failed on all their claims, Alliance for Bio-
Integrity v. Shalala is notable for several reasons.  First, it was the 
earliest major challenge to the government’s Coordinated Framework 
and the FDA’s Statement of Policy.  Second, it highlights the great 
amount of deference the judicial system initially gave to the 
government without actually analyzing the science underlying the 
agency’s action.71  Third, the case acknowledges that even scientists at 
the FDA questioned the government’s approach to regulating 
biotechnology at the time of the policy statement.72 
As science has progressed, so too have the courts.  While Alliance 
for Bio-Integrity was a case decided in 2000, using a record created in 
or before 1992, more recent cases appear to be less deferential to the 
government.  In International Dairy Foods Association v. Boggs,73, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit examined Ohio’s 
labeling requirements for milk produced using recombinant bovine 
somatotropin (rBST), a genetically engineered growth hormone used 
in dairy cows to increase milk production.74 
In 1992, the FDA approved the use of rBST for milk production 
after finding, consistent with its reliance on substantial equivalence, 
that “there was no significant difference between milk from treated 
and untreated cows.”75  In its guidance document addressing rBST, the 
FDA issued guidance for labeling claims.76  The Ohio Department of 
Agriculture (ODA) acted on this guidance and implemented the 
labeling requirements at issue in the case.77  The International Dairy 
Foods Association (IDFA) and other plaintiffs challenged the labeling 
requirements as unconstitutional.78  One aspect of the challenged 
statute prohibited composition claims on milk labels.79  The Sixth 
Circuit disagreed with the FDA’s finding that there “was no  
 
 
to violating the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.” Id. at 180. 
 71. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 440 (noting the court’s “brief three-paragraph analysis”). 
 72. All. for Bio-Integrity, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 177. 
 73. 622 F.3d 628, 632 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. (quoting Interim Guidance on the Voluntary Labeling of Milk and Milk Products 
from Cows that Have Not Been Treated with Recombinant Bovine Somatotropin, 59 Fed. Reg. 
6,279, 6,280 (Feb. 10, 1994)). 
 76. Id. at 632–33. 
 77. Id. at 633–34. 
 78. Id. at 634. 
 79. Id. at 636. 
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measurable compositional difference between the two.”80  Disagreeing 
with the FDA’s position of substantial equivalence, the court stated: 
[The FDA] conclusion is belied by the record, however, which shows 
that, contrary to the district court’s assertion, a compositional 
difference does exist between milk from untreated cows and 
conventional milk (. . .cows treated with rBST).  As detailed by the 
amici parties seeking to strike down the Rule, the use of rBST in milk 
production has been shown to elevate the levels of insulin-like 
growth factor 1 (IGF-1), a naturally-occurring hormone that in high 
levels is linked to several types of cancers, among other things.81 
The court then acknowledged other differences in the milk from 
cows treated with rBST, including increased fat and lower protein 
content during certain phases, and increased somatic cell counts that 
cause milk to sour more quickly.82  These factors, the court stated, 
prevented it from agreeing with the FDA that there are no 
compositional differences in the two types of milk.83 
Because the court found that there is a compositional difference, 
a claim such as “rbST free” is not misleading.84  The court then 
completed the Central Hudson test for commercial speech and 
determined that the ODA’s prohibition on compositional claims like 
“rbST free” was unconstitutional.85  In doing so, the court noted that 
the state’s interest in preventing deception was weak because the state 
did not demonstrate that consumer deception occurred and concluded 
that the state’s reliance on the FDA’s guidance document as evidence 
that consumers may be misled is not sufficient.86  The court also found 
that ODA’s rule did not directly advance the state’s interest and it was 
more extensive than necessary.87 
This case is significant because, after examining the scientific data, 
the court acknowledged that compositional differences may exist 
between the products of biotechnology and their naturally occurring 
counterparts.  Cows treated with GE hormones create a different 
product, and milk created from cows treated with rBST is not 
substantially equivalent to milk from cows not treated with rBST.88  As 
the court suggested, it is misleading to say the two products, created by 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 636–37. 
 83. Id. at 637. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 638–40. 
 86. Id. at 638. 
 87. Id. at 639. 
 88. Id. at 637 (“Taken collectively, this evidence points to two distinct types of milk.”). 
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different processes, are equivalent.  The case is also significant because 
the court pointedly disagreed with the FDA’s reliance on substantial 
equivalence. 
B. Environment 
Whereas the previous section dealt primarily with the FDA’s 
regulation of foods produced using biotechnology and state reliance on 
FDA guidance, many individuals and organizations also challenge 
biotechnology on environmental grounds. As the Coordinated 
Framework indicates, both the EPA and the USDA have limited 
authority to regulate the environmental impact of GE crops.  In 
addition, NEPA requires that federal agencies complete an 
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement before 
beginning major federal actions.89 A number of environmental 
challenges have taken place in response to APHIS attempts to 
deregulate specific biotech crops.  Because deregulation is a major 
federal action, APHIS must complete an environmental impact 
statement or an environmental assessment when it chooses to 
deregulate a crop.90 
In February 2007, the United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia issued its opinion in International Center for Technology 
Assessment v. Johanns,91 which supports the idea that biotechnology 
raises new issues and demonstrates one way in which biotechnology 
may harm society.  The case involved two types of grass, creeping 
bentgrass and Kentucky bluegrass, both of which are listed as invasive 
weeds by ten federal organizations and 145 non-federal cooperators.92  
Scott developed GE versions of the grasses resistant to glyphosate, 
which would allow those who plant the GE varieties, like golf courses, 
to spray the grass with Round Up and only kill weeds.93  The use of the 
GE seed presented a number of concerns, including: gene flow which 
could allow the genetically engineered mutation to appear in wild 
relatives and persist outside of its intended use, enhanced weediness 
since the plant is already considered a pest and would not be able to be 
killed with Round Up, and a subsequent increase in the use of more 
 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2012).  All. for Bio-Integrity included a NEPA claim but the court 
determined the agency did not undertake a major federal action; it only preserved the status quo. 
See supra note 66, and accompanying text. 
 90. 7 C.F.R. § 372.5 (2016). 
 91. 473 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13–14 (D.C.C. 2007). 
 92. Id. at 13. 
 93. Id. 
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toxic pesticides.94 The International Center for Technology 
Assessment (CTA) and other individual plaintiffs sued the USDA for 
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, challenging the USDA’s 
denial of CTA’s petition to have the GE grasses labeled as noxious 
weeds under the Plant Protection Act.95  The plaintiffs also included 
claims for violations of NEPA and the Administrative Procedure Act 
when the USDA allowed The Scotts Company (“Scotts”) to grow 
certain varieties of genetically engineered grass in field trials without 
(1) identifying whether GE creeping bentgrass was a plant pest under 
PPA or (2) preparing an environmental impact statement or an 
environmental assessment as required by NEPA.96  Scotts, who 
petitioned the USDA to deregulate the GE seed at issue, intervened 
as a defendant.97 
Scotts challenged plaintiff’s standing, arguing that plaintiffs had 
not incurred an injury in fact.98  In addressing the argument, the Court 
acknowledged that “for injury to plaintiffs’ aesthetic interests to occur, 
it is not essential that plaintiffs actually encounter a [glyphosate-
tolerant creeping bentgrass] plant.  To the contrary, the mere desire to 
use or observe a plant species, even for purely esthetic purposes, is 
undeniably a cognizable interest for purposes of standing.”99  In other 
words, in order to show that they are harmed by defendants’ 
deregulation of genetically engineered grass, plaintiffs only have to 
show that it is likely that GE seed will establish itself in the wild or 
hybridize with naturally occurring grass.100  This later occurred, when 
GE seed escaped the field trial area and contaminated the Crooked 
River National Grassland 13 miles away from the field trial.101 
Where the harm is only an increased risk of natural grass being 
contaminated with GE grass, courts must find that the likelihood is 
“nontrivial.”102 Following an extensive quantitative analysis, the court 
determined the increased risk in this case to be somewhere between 
.7% and 8.9%, which it found to be non-trivial.103 
 
 94. Id. at 14. 
 95. Id. at 12. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 12–13. 
 98. Id. at 14. 
 99. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Holly Gill, Study reports spread of GMO, PORTLAND TRIB. (Aug. 20, 2006, 6:00 PM), 
http://portlandtribune.com/msp/129-news/138539-study-reports-spread-of-gmo. 
 102. Int’l Ctr. for Tech., 473 F. Supp. 2d at 16. 
 103. Id. at 20–21. The court also cited case law that found an increased risk of 1 in 10,000 is 
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Following the substantially equivalent line of reasoning, Scotts 
argued that even if plaintiffs encountered glyphosate-tolerant creeping 
bentgrass in their areas of interest, there would be no harm because 
they would not be able to tell the difference, unless they sprayed it with 
glyphosate.104  In an apparent rejection of the doctrine of substantial 
equivalence, the court stated: “Plaintiffs’ alleged interest is in viewing 
native fauna, and the relevant inquiry is whether injury to that interest 
is probable or has occurred, regardless of whether the injury is 
visible.”105  The fact that plaintiffs could not visually distinguish 
between the GE and non-GE plants was irrelevant.  Harm to the mere 
interest of viewing non-GE plants is sufficient. 
Following its finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the court 
went on to determine that APHIS improperly denied the plaintiffs’ 
petition to have the grasses listed as noxious weeds, and acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously by not completing an environmental 
assessment or environmental impact statement when it chose to allow 
field trials of glyphosate-tolerant creeping bentgrass.106  The court 
remanded the noxious weed petition to APHIS, and noted that APHIS 
had wide discretion under the PPA to determine which weeds to 
classify as noxious, so long as it based its decision on sound science.107 
On the NEPA claim, the court found that APHIS must conduct 
an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement 
“[w]hen a confined field release of genetically engineered organisms or 
products involves new species or organisms or novel modifications that 
raise new issues.”108  Because APHIS failed to present evidence that it 
had made proper findings to exclude itself from producing an 
environmental assessment or environmental impact statement for the 
field trials, it acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.109  According 
to the court, the record contained “substantial evidence” that field tests 
could significantly affect the “quality of the human environment” and 
the “tests may have involved, at the least, novel modifications (if not 
“new organisms”) that raised new environmental issues.”110  Because 
 
non-trivial, suggesting an extremely low bar to show harm. Id. at 21. 
 104. Id. at 22. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 29. 
 107. Id. at 26–27. APHIS appears to have utilized its wide discretion when it determined GE 
Kentucky Bluegrass was not a noxious weed and therefore not subject to APHIS regulation.  See 
id. at 22. 
 108. Id. at 20 (citing 7 C.F.R. § 372.5(d)(4)). 
 109. Id. at 29. 
 110. Id. at 30. 
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of these new environmental issues, the government could not rely on 
the notion that the end product is substantially equivalent to its non-
GE counterpart. 
The case demonstrates two important factors: (1) the non-trivial 
possibility that people will encounter genetically engineered grass in a 
natural environment is a legally cognizable harm and (2) the release of 
genetically engineered organisms “raise[s] new issues,”111 a proposition 
the Coordinated Framework seems to overlook.  If the GE grass seed 
truly were substantially equivalent, it would not harm plaintiff’s 
aesthetic interests and would not raise new issues. 
Four years after the case, the USDA determined it would not 
regulate Kentucky bluegrass.112  The USDA based its decision on two 
factors.  First, when Scotts genetically engineered the grass it did not 
include a plant pest, a fact that exempted it from the PPA.113  Second, 
the USDA determined that the grass is not a noxious weed because it 
is the same as naturally occurring bluegrass, which people can find 
nearly anywhere.114  Consequently, Scotts is now free to market the 
product commercially, and plans to introduce it to the market in 
2015.115 
While parties who oppose the widespread release of genetically 
engineered products have been successful in challenging agency action 
to demand environmental assessments or environmental impact 
statements, the end result may be of limited significance.  Scotts proved 
this when it chose to engineer the plant so it did not include a plant 
pest, thereby removing it from the USDA’s jurisdiction.  Once the 
USDA determined it was not a noxious weed, the USDA then had no 
authority to regulate the crop.  Just as the USDA did when it 
determined GE grass was not a noxious weed, agencies may exercise 
their discretion after an environmental assessment or environmental 
 
 111. Id. 





 113. Id. 
 114. Id. The USDA’s finding that GE and non-GE Kentucky Bluegrass are the same seems 
to ignore the court’s acknowledgment that GE Kentucky Bluegrass is different because it cannot 
be killed with Round Up, in addition to the court’s finding that the mere presence of GE plants 
harms the aesthetic value the public has in viewing native flora. 
 115. Mary Vanac, Scotts tests genetically modified grass seed at homes, THE COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Jan. 31, 2014, 8:10 AM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2014/01/31 
/scotts-tests-modified-grass-seed-at-homes.html. 
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impact statement to still allow the widespread use of GE products.  In 
some cases, the existing laws provide an inadequate framework for 
addressing the challenges associated with the widespread use of GE 
seeds, as the court highlighted in Center for Food Safety v. Vilsack.116 
In Center for Food Safety, the plaintiffs challenged APHIS’s 
unconditional deregulation of GE alfalfa.117  They argued that APHIS 
violated the PPA when it concluded that GE alfalfa was not a plant 
pest or noxious weed.118  To support their claim that APHIS should 
regulate GE alfalfa as a plant pest, the plaintiffs put forth two primary 
arguments: (1) GE alfalfa is a plant pest because it will cross-pollinate 
with non-GE alfalfa and (2) widespread commercialization of GE 
alfalfa will cause increased glyphosate use and a subsequent increase 
in superweeds.119 
After reviewing the PPA and applicable regulations, the court 
noted that APHIS correctly determined that GE alfalfa was not a plant 
pest and that, once it made that decision, it no longer had discretion to 
do anything other than deregulate GE alfalfa.120  The definition of plant 
pest and the agency’s longstanding interpretation of plant pests did not 
include any consideration of the potential for cross-pollination and 
increased glyphosate resistance among weeds.121  The court also found 
that the agency was not required to review GE alfalfa as a noxious 
weed once it determined it was not a plant pest.122  Because no party 
petitioned APHIS to make such a determination, APHIS did not err 
when it did not evaluate GE alfalfa as a noxious weed.123 
Interestingly, APHIS noted in its environmental impact statement 
that the environmentally preferred outcome is continued regulation of 
GE alfalfa.124  APHIS acknowledged that the possible harms from 
deregulation include cross-pollination that might harm organic and 
non-GE farmers, cross-pollination that could limit exports to foreign 
markets that do not allow GE products, and potential increased costs 
 
 116. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 117. Id. at 832. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. In earlier litigation, Plaintiffs established that bees pollinate alfalfa and GE alfalfa 
may be cross-pollinated at a distance of up to 2 miles from the field where it is planted. Geertson 
Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06–01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) 
(memorandum). 
 120. Ctr. for Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 841. 
 121. Id. at 840–41. 
 122. Id. at 843. 
 123. Id. at 833. 
 124. Id. at 838. 
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for non-GE farmers who have to test their crops for the presence of 
GE alfalfa.125  But APHIS cannot consider these economic harms in its 
determination of what constitutes a plant pest.126  Similarly, the Court 
and APHIS acknowledged that deregulation of GE alfalfa will increase 
glyphosate use by an estimated 4800 percent, but the PPA does not 
concern itself with such possibilities.127 
Center for Food Safety highlights the need for congressional 
action.  In a comment directed at the challenges of regulating GE 
technology under the Coordinated Framework, the court said, “The 
job of updating the [Plant Protection Act] to address the potential 
harms caused by genetic modification (including transgenic 
contamination and increased herbicide use) is a job for the Congress, 
not this court, to undertake.”128 
The earlier stages of litigation in this case also demonstrated that 
courts are unwilling to accept the underlying premise of the 
Coordinated Framework in claims alleging violations of NEPA.  In 
Geertson Seed Farms v. Monsanto, the precursor to Center for Food 
Safety, the district court ruled that APHIS’s finding of no significant 
impact under its environmental assessment failed to take the “hard 
look” required by NEPA.129  Unlike the statutes used to regulate under 
the Coordinated Framework, NEPA aims to prevent “other 
undesirable and unattended consequences” in addition to protecting 
health, safety, and the environment.130  Because of its wide scope, the 
“hard look” required by NEPA allows, and requires, agencies to 
consider a multitude of factors, including increased glyphosate use and 
the potential for transgenic pollination.131  Because bees pollinate 
alfalfa and can travel up to two miles, non-GE farmers in a 2-mile 
radius are at risk for cross-pollination.132  The court acknowledged that 
it is an undesirable consequence to eliminate “a farmer’s choice to 
grow non-genetically engineered crops, or a consumer’s choice to eat  
 
 
 125. Id. at 841. 
 126. Id. at 838. See also 7 U.S.C. § 7702(14) (2012) (limiting plant pests to agents at any living 
stage). 
 127. Ctr. for Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 836, 841. 
 128. Id. at 841. 
 129. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06–01075 CRB, 2007 WL 518624, at *10 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 13, 2007) (memorandum). 
 130. Id. at 9–10. 
 131. Id. at 10. 
 132. Id. at 2. 
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non-genetically engineered food.”133 Rejecting the doctrine of 
substantial equivalence, the court stated: 
For those farmers who choose to grow non-genetically engineered 
alfalfa, the possibility that their crops will be infected with the 
engineered gene is tantamount to the elimination of all alfalfa; they 
cannot grow their chosen crop.  The government’s apparent belief 
that farmers’ and consumers’ choice is irrational because the 
engineered gene is similar in all biological respects to a gene found 
in nature (although never in alfalfa) is beside the point.134 
Both Geertson and Center for Food Safety are important for 
several reasons.  First, both cases acknowledge the severe limitations 
of the Coordinated Framework and highlight that there are both 
economic and environmental consequences that the government has 
not adequately addressed with existing law.  Second, they further 
demonstrate that at least some courts are unwilling to accept the 
artificial distinction between process and product as drawn by the 
Coordinated Framework.  Third, each case’s complex procedural 
history and arguments demonstrate the need for clearer guidance on 
biotechnology.135 
C. Intellectual Property 
As it did with laws that regulate biotechnology in food and the 
environment, Congress did not specifically authorize intellectual 
property protection for products of biotechnology.  Rather, inventors 
protect genetically engineered seeds and seed parts using statutes that 
predate the advent of biotechnology.136  Although seed producers have 
three different means to protect their inventions, a utility patent 
provides the greatest amount of protection from infringing uses and 
 
 133. Id. at 8. 
 134. Id. at 9. 
 135. The case originated as Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns in the district court. See id. at *1. 
Monsanto, who intervened as a Defendant, appealed the scope of the district court’s injunction 
to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the lower court’s decision. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, 
570 F.3d 1130 at 1133 (9th Cir. 2009). Monsanto appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed 
the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139 at 166 
(2010). APHIS released its environmental impact statement, as ordered by the district court, in 
December 2010. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829 at 838 (9th Cir. 2013). The Center 
for Food Safety then filed suit against APHIS and appealed the district court’s decision to uphold 
the agency’s decision to deregulate. Id. at 831–32. The dispute culminated in Ctr. for Food Safety 
v. Vilsack, where the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. Id. at 843. 
 136. See Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The United States, 
Trade, and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151 (2005) (discussing the 
history of seed-specific legislation during the early 20th century). 
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allows GE seed producers to patent individual components of a seed.137  
As a result, manufacturers of genetically engineered seeds primarily 
rely on utility patents to protect their product. 
The Supreme Court’s application of agricultural biotechnology to 
patent law demonstrates that (1) unlike the Coordinated Framework, 
process matters and (2) the fact that something is human-made makes 
it different enough from its natural counterpart to be patentable 
subject matter. 
Two cases demonstrate how utility patent protection came about 
for GE seeds, even though neither case deals directly with them.  
Diamond v. Chakrabarty involves a genetically engineered 
bacterium138 and J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. 
involves a traditionally bred hybrid seed.139  Chakrabarty and J.E.M. 
Ag Supply, Inc., when read together, demonstrate that genetically 
engineered seeds are patentable subject matter for which a biotech 
company can obtain a utility patent. 
In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court addressed the patentable 
subject matter requirement for obtaining a utility patent.  Chakrabarty, 
a microbiologist, sought a patent on human-made, genetically 
engineered bacteria that could break down components of crude oil.140  
Congress identified the scope of patentable subject matter in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 101, which states: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.141 
The court focused on “manufacture” and “composition of 
matter.”142  Citing a dictionary definition and prior case law, the court 
defined manufacture as: “the production of articles for use from raw or 
prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, 
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by 
 
 137. Id. at 166. The other two forms of protection are a Plant Patent and a Plant Variety 
Protection Certificate.  Although the court in both Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag. Supply discusses 
both, this article focuses on utility patents.  For additional information about Plant Variety 
Protection Certificates and Plant Patents, see David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology and 
Genetically-Modified Foods: Will the Developing World Bite?, 8 VA. J. L. & TECH. 7, 14–22 (2003). 
 138. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
 139. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001). 
 140. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305. 
 141. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
 142. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. 
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machinery.”143  Referring to “common usage” and again citing case law, 
the Court defined composition of matter to include “all compositions 
of two or more substances and . . . all composite articles, whether they 
be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether 
they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.”144  After examining legislative 
history, the Court concluded that “Congress intended statutory subject 
matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man.’”145 
Following its broad interpretation of patentable subject matter, 
the Court acknowledged the limits of § 101.  Citing a series of cases 
dating back to 1853, the Court stated, “[t]he laws of nature, physical 
phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”146  For 
instance, Einstein could not patent “his celebrated law that E=mc2,” 
Newton could not patent the law of gravity, and nobody could patent 
“a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the 
wild.”147  These latter examples explicitly recognize that products of 
nature, like naturally occurring seeds, are not patentable subject 
matter. 
Distinguishing Chakrabarty’s bacteria from “a hitherto unknown 
natural phenomenon,” the court found that man-made bacteria are 
patentable subject matter because they are “a nonnaturally occurring 
manufacture or composition of matter—a product of human ingenuity 
having a distinct name, character [and] use.”148  Moreover, “the 
patentee has produced a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics from any found in nature . . . [the] discovery is not 
nature’s handiwork, but his own; accordingly it is patentable subject 
matter under § 101.”149 
Thus, Chakrabarty stands for the proposition that living things are 
patentable subject matter under § 101, and the relevant distinction is 
not between living and non-living, but between human-made and 
naturally occurring.  Nobody disputed the fact that the bacteria in 
Chakrabarty were a product of human invention, nor could they.  The 
bacteria, as patented, do not exist in nature. 
 
 
 143. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 144. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 145. Id. at 309 (internal citations omitted). 
 146. Id. (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschlalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 
(1972); Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O’Reilly v. 
Morse, 15 How. 62, 112–21 (1854); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 156, 175 (1853)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 309–10 (internal citations omitted). 
 149. Id. at 310. 
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Although the Court in Chakrabarty referred to the Plant Patent 
Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 (PVPA), it 
did so in the context of determining the scope of patentable subject 
matter, and more specifically, to determine whether § 101 included 
living things.  It did not examine whether those acts are the sole means 
for patenting plants, a matter which it decided in J.E.M. Ag Supply. 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Chakrabarty, the Patent 
and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
determined plants were included in the meaning of “manufacture” and 
“composition of matter,” which made them patentable subject matter 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.150  At the time of J.E.M. Ag Supply, the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office had issued more than 1,800 utility 
patents for plants, plant parts, and seeds under 35 U.S.C. § 101.151  
Pioneer Hi-Bred owned such patents on 17 different plants and plant 
parts, and sold such varieties subject to a “limited label license” that 
restricted seed use “solely to produce grain and/or forage.”152  J.E.M. 
Ag Supply, who was not an authorized dealer, purchased patented 
hybrid seeds which bore the license agreement, and resold them.153 
Pioneer Hi-Bred subsequently brought a patent infringement 
suit.154  J.E.M. Ag Supply denied infringement and filed a counterclaim 
for patent invalidity, arguing that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 (creating 
plant patents) and the PVPA (creating Plant Variety Protection 
certificates) are the exclusive means for protecting plant life, which 
makes utility patents obtained on plants under 35 U.S.C. § 101 
invalid.155 
The Court examined the Plant Patent Act and the PVPA, and 
relied heavily on their finding in Chakrabarty that Congress intended 
for 35 U.S.C. § 101 to be broad in scope and applicability.156  
Consequently, the Court found that “plants have always had the 
potential to fall within the general subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101,” 
even though the written description requirement previously made it 
difficult to get a utility patent.157  The Court concluded that the 1930 
Plant Patent Act recognized that a plant breeder’s work was patentable 
 
 150. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. 534 U.S. 124, 131 (2001). 
 151. Id. at 127. 
 152. Id. at 127–28. 
 153. Id. at 128. 
 154. Id. at 128–29. 
 155. Id. at 129. 
 156. Id. at 130–31. 
 157. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original). 
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and relaxed the written description requirement, which made it easier 
for plant breeders to obtain patent protection under a separate plant 
patent.158 
According to the Court, denying breeders a utility patent simply 
because it was difficult to obtain in 1930, however, “would be 
inconsistent with the forward-looking perspective of the utility patent 
statute.”159  In that regard, the 1930 Plant Patent Act did not broaden 
the scope of patentable subject matter, it just made it easier for plant 
breeders to obtain patent protection on new products.160 
The Court also examined the Plant Variety Protection Act 
(PVPA), and reached a similar conclusion.  The Plant Patent Act only 
provided intellectual property protection to asexually reproduced 
plants (reproduced by grafts) and not to sexually reproduced plants 
(reproduced by seeds).161 The Plant Variety Protection Act extended 
intellectual property protection to certain sexually reproduced 
plants.162  As the court noted, the PVPA does not state that Congress 
intended for PVPA certificates to be the exclusive means of intellectual 
property protection for sexually reproduced plants.163 
Because PVPA protection is easier to obtain and protects less, it 
can “easily be reconciled” with allowing plants protection under a 
utility patent.164  In order to obtain a certificate under PVPA, a breeder 
must only demonstrate that the variety is new, distinct, uniform, and 
stable.165  To get a utility patent, a breeder must show that the plant is 
useful and nonobvious.166 In addition, varieties protected by certificates 
under PVPA are subject to more exemptions that weaken the holder’s 
rights when compared to a utility patent, including exemptions for 
research and saving seed to plant the next year’s crop.167  A utility 
patent has no such exceptions.168  Because the two different forms of 
protection have different requirements, and varying levels of 
protection, they can coexist and those that do not meet the stringent 
 
 158. Id. at 134. 
 159. Id. at 135. 
 160. See id. at 134 (noting the PPA “gave patent protection to breeders who were previously 
unable to overcome the obstacles described in Chakrabarty”). 
 161. Id. at 132. 
 162. Id. at 138. 
 163. Id. at 141. 
 164. Id. at 138. 
 165. 7 U.S.C. § 2402(a) (2012). 
 166. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012). 
 167. J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 140. 
 168. Id. at 143. 
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requirements for utility patent protection may still qualify for 
protection under a PVPA certificate.169 
Justice Breyer, in a dissent joined by Justice Stevens, considered 
the Court’s heavy reliance on Chakrabarty misplaced.170  He argued 
that the Court in Chakrabarty examined two statutes that did not deal 
specifically with bacteria, in order to determine whether bacteria were 
patentable subject matter.171 Here, the Court had been asked to 
determine the scope of the same two statutes, which specifically deal 
with the subject matter in dispute—plants.172 Justice Breyer interpreted 
the Plant Patent Act, noting that it applies to all plants, not just those 
asexually reproduced, so long as they are distinct, new, and on one or 
more occasion have been asexually reproduced.173  He correctly noted 
that “virtually any plant” can reproduce both sexually and asexually, 
and that the coverage provided by the act gave the breeder a monopoly 
over asexual reproduction.174  By excluding sexual reproduction, or 
reproduction through seeds, Congress allowed farmers to continue the 
long-standing practice of saving seed.175  Despite Justice Breyer’s 
compelling dissent, the law today allows plant breeders to obtain a 
utility patent on their inventions. 
Although the seeds in dispute were a patented hybrid line and not 
genetically engineered, Chakrabarty and J.E.M. Ag Supply read 
together demonstrate that genetically engineered seeds are patentable 
subject matter for which a biotech company can obtain a utility patent.  
Similar to the Coordinated Framework, the Supreme Court is also 
unwilling to stand in the way of innovation.  However, the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged that, unlike the Coordinated Framework, it 
understands that process matters. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The previous cases demonstrate why Congress must enact 
meaningful legislation to regulate biotechnology.  Today, scientists 
know more about the science underlying agricultural biotechnology 
 
 169. Id. at 144. 
 170. See id. at 147 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (arguing that Chakrabarty did not consider the 
relevant question of “whether the words ‘manufacture’ or ‘compositions of matter’ . . . cover 
plants that also fall within the scope of” the PPA and PVPA). 
 171. Id. at 148–49. 
 172. Id. at 149. 
 173. Id. at 150. 
 174. Id. at 150–51. 
 175. Id. at 151. 
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and that science shows that the assumptions made in creating the 
Coordinated Framework are outdated.  As recent cases demonstrate, 
the Coordinated Framework also fails to account for the interests of 
those affected by biotechnology.  Moreover, current law, which focuses 
on process in granting intellectual property protection and final 
product in food safety and environmental regulation, is inconsistent.  
Lastly, courts cannot currently provide a satisfactory remedy to those 
harmed by biotechnology.  As a result, Congress is the only branch of 
government that can create a meaningful framework to regulate 
biotechnology. 
A. The underlying assumptions of the Coordinated Framework are 
outdated 
Science has progressed significantly since the promulgation of the 
Coordinated Framework.  At the time of its drafting, the framework 
reflected the scientific belief that one gene sequence was traited for 
one specific protein.176  When scientists injected that one sequence into 
a new organism, they believed they were only entering one trait.177  This 
now-rudimentary understanding is demonstrably false, as biologists 
have confirmed that gene sequences are networks that overlap and 
interact in a way such that the insertion of a gene sequence in a new 
plant will alter the way these sequences operate and communicate with 
one another.178  As early as 2000, other countries began to question 
their reliance on the doctrine of substantial equivalence, including 
major U.S. trade partners the European Union and Canada.179 
The GE pea plant example at the beginning of this article 
demonstrates just how unsophisticated our understanding of 
biotechnology is.  This alone should give consumers and Congress 
some pause.  While GE plants currently on the market may not have 
these allergenic properties (or such allergenic properties have not yet 
presented themselves), the mere possibility that the Coordinated 
Framework created a pathway for the possibility of such characteristics 
 
 176. See Maria R. Lee-Muramoto, Reforming the “Uncoordinated” Framework for Regulation 
of Biotechnology, 17 DRAKE J. OF AGRIC. L. 311, 339 (2013) (noting that the Coordinated 
Framework’s doctrine of substantial equivalence is based on the “one gene-one protein” model); 
Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 221–22. 
 177. See Lee-Muramoto, supra note 175, at 339–40 (noting the tenant of the “Central 
Dogma”); Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 221–22. 
 178. Lee-Muramoto, supra note 175, at 341; Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 221. 
 179. See McGarity, supra note 7, at 489–90 (“With the impending demise of the substantial 
equivalence doctrine as a credible theoretical underpinning, the fragile veneer that has protected 
the regulatory process in the United States from overwhelming criticism is cracking.”). 
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in our food is alarming.  The Coordinated Framework operates under 
the assumption that products of biotechnology are the same as their 
natural counterparts, but the GE pea plant demonstrates otherwise. 
The troubles resulting from these outdated assumptions are 
compounded in the courts.  When the court heard Alliance for Bio-
Integrity in 2000, it reviewed an FDA record developed in the lead-up 
to the FDA’s 1992 Statement of Policy.  Eight years passed from the 
time the FDA created the record and the time the court heard the 
challenge.  While the plaintiffs had contemporary scientific evidence 
that demonstrated fallacies in the Statement of Policy, the court could 
not consider them in determining whether the agency acted arbitrarily 
and capriciously in 1992.  Today, scientists know even more about 
genetic engineering, or at the very least, have a greater understanding 
of how much we do not know.  But challenging agency action—be it 
that of the FDA, the EPA, or the USDA—is exceedingly difficult when 
these agencies are operating under the Coordinated Framework, a 
policy developed based on an understanding of science in 1986. 
When the drafters of the Coordinated Framework created the 
policy, they failed to account for the ways in which GE technology 
would alter biology and ecology.  In their minds, GE technology 
created a product substantially equivalent to its natural counterpart.  
So, in theory, the use of recombinant bovine somatotropin as a growth 
hormone in dairy cows caused those cows to produce milk substantially 
equivalent to milk from cows not treated with rBST. 
Thankfully, not all court actions are limited to older agency 
records that rely on outdated science.  In International Dairy, the court 
found that the two milk products were in fact compositionally 
different.180  Milk produced from cows with rBST had higher levels of 
insulin-like growth factor 1, higher somatic cell counts, and, during 
certain phases of milk production, increased fat and decreased protein 
content.181  Thus, at least one court opinion uses quantifiable science to 
highlight a fallacy in the Coordinated Framework’s underlying 
assumption of substantial equivalence. 
Similarly, scientists continue to learn more about DNA.  We now 
know that genes overlap with each other and operate in a network 
instead of segmented parts that scientists can remove from one plant 
and expect to perform the same function in another.182  The growing 
 
 180. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 636 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 181. Id. at 636–37. 
 182. See Van Tassel, supra note 2, at 231–32 (noting that “sections of previously characterized 
junk DNA modulate a labyrinthine of silencing, switching and splicing operations”). 
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field of epigenetics is helping scientists understand how and when 
genes express themselves, and the possibility that certain factors may 
silence genetic expression in one instance, and unleash its expression 
in later iterations.183  Just like individuals in a community, genes 
interact with one another and are a product of their environment.184  
When removed, they can and do act differently.  Because society does 
not have the benefit of centuries of knowledge and real world trials 
with these new plants as they do with naturally occurring plants, 
assuming that our bodies and the environment will interact with them 
in the exact same way is shortsighted. 
B. The Coordinated Framework does not account for all interests 
affected by biotechnology 
The Coordinated Framework’s focus on products of 
biotechnology unnecessarily limits the scope of factors impacted by GE 
technology.  This is particularly noticeable in three different areas: the 
environment, international trade, and the non-GE growing industry. 
Both Center for Food Safety and Geerston Seed Farms highlight 
the disconnect created by the Coordinated Framework’s silence on the 
environmental effects of biotechnology. The court in Center for Food 
Safety acknowledged that annual glyphosate use would increase from 
a half-million pounds to more than 24 million pounds,185 which 
undeniably creates additional stress on the environment.  The court 
explicitly acknowledged its inability to address the known increase in 
herbicide use that will result from the deregulation of alfalfa.  While 
the district court in Geertson Seed Farms found that increased 
glyphosate use was a factor showing that the USDA failed to take the 
hard look required by NEPA, this finding only helped establish that 
the USDA needed to complete an environmental impact statement.186  
After completing the environmental impact statement, the USDA did 
 
 183. See id. at 236–37 (noting that epigenetic mechanisms “turn genes on and off during the 
course of an organism’s life” according to environmental factors). 
 184. See id. at 236 (“Epigentics concentrates on the multiple influences on DNA . . . that 
determine whether genes are turned on and off . . . .”); see also id. at 237 (describing epigenetic 
inheritance in genetically modified food). 
 185. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 186. See Geertson Farms Inc. v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075, 2007 WL 1302981 at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
May 3, 2007) (memorandum) (“[G]ene transmission could and had occurred . . . [and] failure to 
analyze the likely extent of gene flow . . . did not demonstrate the ‘hard look’ required by 
NEPA.”); see also Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2,743, 2,759 (noting that 
under some circumstances it could be “hard to see why the limited planting and harvesting . . . did 
not also require the preparation of an EIS). 
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not have the authority to stop deregulation of alfalfa.187  As a result, 
one of the few accomplishments of existing laws and regulations is that 
they confirm that the deregulation of alfalfa would cause growers to 
use more glyphosate.188  Although the EPA has the authority to 
regulate the amount of glyphosate used on crops, that decision making 
process is not included with or tied into the decision to deregulate a 
GE crop.  Because the alfalfa in question was not modified to include 
a pesticide, the EPA had no role in the GE approval process even 
though deregulation of the GE seed will have a significant impact on 
the environment and the amount of glyphosate used. The Coordinated 
Framework fails to consider environmental concerns, thereby drawing 
a completely artificial line between food production and the 
environment. 
Another interest identified in Center for Food Safety, throughout 
the opinion, was the potential impact of adventitious presence, or 
unauthorized cross-pollination.189  The possibility of cross-pollination 
is particularly relevant for GE alfalfa because alfalfa is pollinated by 
bees which can travel up to two miles, thereby creating risks for non-
GE alfalfa growers up to two miles away from a GE alfalfa field.190 
Cross-pollination has the potential to impact a number of different 
areas, including international trade, organic production, and non-GE 
production.  Because some foreign countries will not import genetically 
engineered products,191 farmers whose non-GE crops are cross-
contaminated with GE crops will suffer losses.  In some instances, a 
country will ban all imports of a specific crop from a country based 
merely on a fear that imported crops may contain GE products, which 
can impact an entire industry.  For example, when an Oregon farmer 
discovered rogue GE wheat in his field, Japan halted all imports of 
Oregon wheat.192  Wheat growers throughout the United States sued 
 
 187. See Ctr. For Food Safety, 718 F.3d at 842 (“[O]nce APHIS concluded that RRA was not 
a plant pest . . . the agency had no jurisdiction to continue regulating the crop.”). 
 188. Id. at 841. 
 189. See id. at 832 (noting the plaintiff’s concern over RRA cross-pollinating with 
conventional alfalfa plants). 
 190. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF AGRIC., GLYPHOSATE-TOLERANT ALFALFA EVENTS J101 
AND J103: REQUEST OF NONREGULATED STATUS 25–26 (2010), https://www.aphis.usda.gov/bio 
technology/downloads/alfalfa/gt_alfalfa%20_feis.pdf. 
 191. Sarah Shemkus, Is China’s GMO Corn Ban Protecting Consumers or Protecting 
Markets?, THE GUARDIAN, (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/ 
2014/nov/20/china-gmo-corn-boycott-markets. 
 192. Aya Takada, Japan Halts Some U.S. Wheat Imports on Gene-Altered Crops, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-05-
30/japan-halts-some-u-s-wheat-imports-on-gene-altered-crops; Dan Charles, In Oregon, the 
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Monsanto, the producer of the GE seeds, for economic losses incurred 
as a result of Japan’s ban.193  As this example makes clear, both possible 
and actual cross-contamination of non-GE crops with GE crops can 
lead to economic losses for growers of non-GE seed.  With a crop such 
as alfalfa that is easily subject to cross-pollination, nothing in the 
current GE regulatory process forces any government agency to 
consider the potential economic impacts of cross-pollination before a 
GE product enters the market. 
The possibility of cross-pollination for organic and non-GE 
producers can have even greater economic impacts.  If these types of 
growers want to export their products, they will run into the same 
problems noted above.  Even in domestic markets, however, they will 
likely incur additional costs.  Organic farmers cannot sell their crops as 
organic if they are contaminated with GE product.  As a result, the 
organic farmer typically must pay for additional testing to ensure the 
absence of GE crops.  If organic crops are contaminated, the farmer 
loses the benefit of an organic crop price premium.  Also, an organic 
farmer may buy seeds that allow her to save seed to plant the next year, 
like most farmers used to do.  If GE seeds contaminate the farmer’s 
fields they not only lose their organic status, but the farmer also incurs 
additional costs in buying more seeds the following year.  Because 
there is now a price premium associated with some non-GE crops, 
these same realities apply to growers who choose to raise non-GE 
crops, even if not certified organic.194 
C. Focus on product, and not process is artificial and inconsistent 
Although prescient observers likely knew it in 1986, the distinction 
between product and process in the Coordinated Framework is 
artificial and inconsistent.  Thankfully, the courts seem less willing than 
the executive branch to accept this artificial distinction.  The court in 
International Center acknowledged that process alone can cause harm.  
There, residents of Central Oregon had an interest in viewing native 
flora and the small possibility that GE grass could replace native grass, 
even though it looked the same, was sufficient to cause an injury.  
 
GMO Wheat Mystery Deepens, NPR: THE SALT (July 17, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/ 
2013/07/17/202684064/in-oregon-the-gmo-wheat-mystery-deepens. 
 193. Elizabeth Barber, Monsanto Reaches $2.4M Settlement with U.S. Wheat Farmers, TIME 
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://time.com/3582953/monsanto-wheat-farming-genetically-modified-settlem 
ent/. 
 194. Jacob Bunge, Fields of Gold: GMO-Free Crops Prove Lucrative for Farmers, WALL 
STREET JOURNAL (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/fields-of-gold-gmo-free-crops-
prove-lucrative-for-farmers-1422909700. 
Findley - For Publication (Do Not Delete) 3/9/2017  11:08 AM 
Fall 2016] GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS 149 
Visually, the two products—GE grass and non-GE grass—appeared 
the same.  However, the fact that Scotts genetically engineered one of 
the grasses was enough to harm the plaintiff’s interest in viewing native 
flora. 
Center for Food Safety and Geertson also highlight the fact that 
process matters.  If the GE alfalfa truly was substantially equivalent to 
its natural counterpart, the parties would not have pursued the case up 
to the Supreme Court and then back to the Ninth Circuit. Food is the 
unique result of many interdependent factors in the production 
process, and the alteration of any single factor can have a butterfly 
effect on the entire chain, including a different end product.  To 
regulate food without regard to these factors, and the important steps 
each of them play, is indefensibly shortsighted. 
The alternative, an emphasis on process rather than product, 
would be consistent with other aspects of food regulation.  Foods 
labeled organic are organic because of the process by which farmers 
and food manufacturers created them.195  Fish markets can label fish as 
“wild caught” because of how the fish are raised and harvested.196  Juice 
created from concentrate is labeled “from concentrate” because of the 
process by which it is created.197  Olive oil can be labeled extra virgin 
because of the way it is pressed.198  These examples demonstrate that 
an emphasis on process is not new in the regulation of food. 
Perhaps nowhere is the distinction between process and product 
more relevant than in intellectual property protection.  In order to 
obtain a utility patent, which is the primary means for protecting 
biotech products, the inventor must show, among other things, that the 
product is man-made.  In that regard, intellectual property protection 
completely flips the analysis and focuses exclusively on process.  While 
neither the Coordinated Framework nor the 1992 Policy Statement 
purported to address intellectual property, the case law is relevant for 
two reasons.  First, like the Coordinated Framework, Congress created 
the laws that govern intellectual property rights in biotech products 
prior to the advent of agricultural biotechnology.199  As a result, courts 
had to apply then-existing law to new technology.  Second, the grant of 
 
 195. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2016) (defining “organic”). 
 196. Cf. 7 C.F.R. § 60.300 (2016) (stating that product sold as a combination of farm-raised 
and wild fish may be labeled “wild caught”). 
 197. 21 C.F.R. § 102.33(g)(1) (2016). 
 198. See United States Standards for Grades of Olive Oil and Olive-Pomace Oil, 74 Fed. Reg. 
22,363 (Oct. 25, 2010) (noting that extra virgin olive oil is unprocessed). 
 199. See generally supra note 1. 
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intellectual property rights has fueled the rapid increase in the use of 
GE technology.200  Absent Congressional action, courts have taken on 
the responsibility of expanding the scope of protection for agricultural 
biotech companies and have allowed them to extend their monopolies. 
When determining the scope of patentable subject matter, the 
court acknowledged the economic incentive provided by patent 
protection: the grant or denial of a patent determines whether research 
is “accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by want of 
incentives.”201  Thus, when the Supreme Court determined the relevant 
distinction is whether the product is created by man or nature, it 
“accelerated the hope of reward” for man-made products of 
biotechnology.  Moreover, the court based its expansion of this right 
entirely on how manufacturers created the product.  It is inconsistent 
to base the grant of a monopoly on process, and to then limit the 
regulation of that monopoly based on product. 
D. Courts have taken it as far as they can, now Congress must act 
Despite a patchwork of laws and regulations, courts have dutifully 
examined the facts surrounding the rapid increase in agricultural 
biotechnology.  From Alliance for Bio-Integrity in 2000 to Center for 
Food Safety in 2013, courts have increased their scrutiny when 
examining the government’s reliance on the doctrine of substantial 
equivalence.  Recent cases highlight not only the unwillingness of 
courts to accept the doctrine, but also their limitations in demanding 
greater agency action. 
In Alliance for Bio-Integrity, where the court sided with the 
government on every claim challenging the FDA’s 1992 Policy 
Statement, the dispute was largely procedural and the court did not 
have an opportunity to examine the most recent scientific data.  The 
court’s analysis was short and demonstrated the limitations of relying 
on an agency’s interpretation of existing statutes. It is difficult to show 
arbitrary and capricious behavior, particularly when relying on dated 
science.  Even though some scientists at the FDA disagreed when the 
agency created the Policy Statement, this disagreement was insufficient 
to find the agency’s actions arbitrary and capricious. Because the 
court’s review of agency action is limited to the agency’s record at the 
time the agency acted, new science, even if contrary to previously 
accepted science, is not relevant.  Lastly, because the government’s 
 
 200. Brian D. Wright, Plant Genetic Engineering and Intellectual Property Protection, 
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY IN CALIFORNIA SERIES, PUBLICATION 8,186, at 4. 
 201. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980). 
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policy directing agency regulation of biotechnology is based not on law, 
but on an executive branch notice (Coordinated Framework) and 
policy statements (Statement of Policy), it is difficult to challenge the 
underlying approach or influence the creation of policy as one would 
in the traditional democratic process through legislation in Congress or 
rulemaking in administrative agencies.202 
In International Dairy, the court offered little deference to the 
FDA and the State of Ohio’s reliance on FDA guidance.  There, the 
court could, and did, consider more recent science when it found that 
milk from cows treated with GE hormones created milk 
compositionally different from cows treated without GE hormones.  
Unlike Alliance for Bio-Integrity, the challenge to agency regulation 
occurred closer to the time of the regulation, and the record more 
accurately reflected the state of science. The court found the State of 
Ohio’s reliance on FDA guidance and the doctrine of substantial 
equivalence misplaced.  The process mattered, and the process created 
a different product.  As a result, the government could not prevent 
dairy producers from identifying their milk as being from cows not 
treated with rBST. Despite the favorable outcome for dairy farmers 
who did not use rBST, the case involved a state regulation that relied 
on FDA guidance.  While the Ohio regulation was unconstitutional, 
questionable guidance still exists at the federal level. 
In International Center, the court again analyzed quantitative 
scientific data and came to the conclusion that GE crops are not 
substantially equivalent to their natural counterparts.203  There, the 
court concluded that a member of the public is harmed even when the 
possibility of them seeing GE grass in the natural environment is less 
than 10% (or even as small as less than 1%).204  The fact that GE and 
non-GE grasses look the same is irrelevant.  The mere fact that one is 
genetically engineered to be glyphosate resistant is enough to harm the 
public’s interest in seeing native flora.  Moreover, because of the risk 
to the environment from cross-pollination and the inability to control 
pollen flow, the government must complete an environmental impact 
statement.205  This highlights the court’s belief that genetically 
 
 202. See Peck, supra note 29. 
 203. See supra notes 90–110 and accompanying text (summarizing the case). 
 204. See Int’l. Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F.Supp 2d 9, 20–21 (D.D.C. 2007) 
(noting that Crooked River National Grassland’s “extremely close” proximity to area where 
“near-term GTCB establishment risk may fall somewhere between 0.7 and 8.9 percent” means 
that “the risk is certainly non-trivial” that GTCB could establish itself in the Grassland). 
 205. See id. at 29–30. 
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engineered plants present unique issues and are not equivalent to 
naturally occurring counterparts. 
But the court’s authority is limited.  As Scotts later demonstrated, 
scientists can circumvent existing regulations by using different 
techniques for genetic engineering.  After the case, the USDA 
determined that it did not have the authority to regulate a variety of 
glyphosate resistant Kentucky bluegrass created by Scotts because it 
was not a plant pest or noxious weed. While some believe the USDA’s 
reasoning is questionable, it may be difficult to prove it is arbitrary and 
capricious.  The new product presents the same concerns raised by the 
court in International Center, but the USDA’s interpretation of laws 
that predate biotechnology have limited the scope of the court’s power. 
The limitations of the judicial system are highlighted and expressly 
acknowledged in Center for Food Safety.  There, following several 
rounds of appellate litigation, the court found that after completing an 
environmental impact statement the USDA completed its statutory 
mandate.206  Although new harms were likely to occur, including 
potential economic losses and environmental damage, the court had no 
authority to require the USDA to consider those impacts in deciding 
to deregulate alfalfa.207  The district court in Geertson undertook a 
rigorous analysis of scientific data and found that the USDA acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when it found no significant impact to the 
environment by the deregulation of GE alfalfa.  Rather, unlike its 
natural counterpart, GE alfalfa presented a number of potential 
environmental and economic harms that the USDA had to consider.  
But, after a circuitous path through the courts, the Ninth Circuit found 
in Center for Food Safety that there is no other remedy within the 
existing framework.  After requiring an environmental impact 
statement, the judicial system could do nothing more to address the 
environmental and economic harms caused by the deregulation of 
alfalfa.208 
Consequently, the impetus is on Congress.  Consumer groups and 
non-GE farmers can continue to challenge the government and 
biotechnology companies in court, but the remedies available to them 
do little more than delay the inevitable.  Because there are valuable 
interests not currently accounted for, including the future health and 
 
 206. Ctr. for Food Safety v. Vilsack, 718 F. 3d 829 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 207. See id. at 842 (holding that the USDA “was not required to look at alternatives to the 
unconditional deregulation of RRA” because it lacked jurisdiction to adopt the alternatives). 
 208. See id. (holding that the USDA was not required to consider the alternatives to 
deregulation). 
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wellbeing of society and the environment, Congress needs to act.  Like 
technological advances in other areas, including drones, information 
technology, and energy, citizens have a right to participate in the 
democratic process on issues that impact their lives.  When the 
government deliberately conceals those avenues by governing from 
notices and policy statements, it fails to represent the people. 
CONCLUSION 
In the nearly thirty years since the Coordinated Framework, many 
things have changed. While it might have been a difficult task thirty 
years ago even for the most prudent observer forecasting these changes 
and trying to predict the ways in which agricultural biotechnology 
might impact our lives, we now have the experience necessary to 
identify at least some of these impacts.  Most notably, we know that 
food safety for GE products is not as simple as we thought, we know 
that GE products impact the environment through increased pesticide 
use and cross-pollination with non-GE crops, and we know that the use 
of GE crops can cause negative economic consequences.  The 
Coordinated Framework accounts for none of these impacts.  While a 
growing number of cases in the judicial system question the doctrine of 
substantial equivalence and highlight gaps in the Coordinated 
Framework, courts are increasingly limited in the remedies they can 
provide.  As a result, it is time for government to operate in the way 
our founders intended.  Congress needs to create and pass laws that 
meaningfully address the interests unaccounted for by a patchwork of 
legislative shortcomings. 
 
